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Antenuptial agreements are made by prospective spouses in 
contemplation and consideration of marriage.1  They showed up in 
our legal system in the sixteenth century when couples used them 
in attempts to alter the incidents of the legal marital property 
regime.2 The validity of these agreements was then uncertain.  They 
were thus the subject of litigation.3  Now, 400 years later, couples 
are still using antenuptial agreements to alter the incidents of the 
marital property regime, their validity is still uncertain and they are 
still the subject of litigation. 
I have addressed antenuptial agreements as a genre twice 
before4 and revisit them now, ten years later, to see how they fare.  
 
 † Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family Law.  
My thanks to Elizabeth K. Lee ’03 for her help with this paper. 
       1.     See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL  AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1), 9B U.L.A. 371 (1983 & 
Supp. 2001).  These are sometimes called “premarital” or “prenuptial” 
agreements.  
       2.     Both chancery and common law courts were passing on their validity.  5 
SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 310-12 (3rd ed. 1945). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. 
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Part I of this article is an introduction;  it describes the typical 
antenuptial agreement, the dilemma these agreements present for 
the law and the special rules of fairness developed for assessing 
their validity.  Part II is a review of the cases decided by the highest 
state courts in the last ten years.  Part III is a brief discussion of the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and the ALI Principles of 
Family Dissolution.  Finally, Part IV is the Conclusion which 
discusses drafting for validity. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s garden-variety antenuptial agreement is made between 
engaged5 parties on the eve of marriage.6  The parties are in a 
confidential relationship,7 likely to be of unequal bargaining 
power8 and in less than rational states.9  They are thus ripe for 
overreaching and prone to making bad bargains.  The  purpose of 
their agreement is to alter the state-prescribed marital property 
regime which would otherwise apply to  them when the marriage 
ends.10  The agreement, thus, deals with matters of great interest 
and importance to the state: property division, support, elective or 
 
REV. 1059 (1988); Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An 
Update, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 1 (1992). 
 5. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “engaged” to mean:  “That is 
under a promise to marry; betrothed.”  5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 248 (2d ed. 
1991). 
 6. Literally, in too many cases.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §7.05 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4 
2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. 
 7. E.g., Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Nev. 1992); Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994); Estate of Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d 
1343, 1346-47 (Utah 1994). 
 8. See Marriage of Bonds v. Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817 (Cal. 2000) (concerning 
husband who was a major league baseball player and foreign, unemployed wife); 
McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85, 94 (La. 1996) (Justice Johnson concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (concerning husband who was attorney); Randolph v. 
Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. 1996) (concerning husband who was 
successful real estate businessman owning assets amounting to approximately 
$800,000 while wife owned virtually no assets); Beesley, 883 P.2d at 1345 
(concerning husband who owned many assets while wife was nurse’s aid making 
$3.50 an hour); Sogg, 832 P.2d at 785-86 (concerning millionaire husband and wife 
who was a sporadically employed country singer). 
 9. They are in love and suffering from the limits of cognition and bounded 
rationality.  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995).  But see In re Estate of Thies, 903 P.2d 186, 190 (Mont. 
1995) (holding the parties “are not assumed to have lost their judgmental faculties 
because of their pending marriage”). 
 10. See, e.g., Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d at 1347. 
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intestate shares, allowances, exemptions and homestead.  Typically, 
the parties waive some or all of these rights.11  The agreement is 
executed by the parties before the marriage has begun and 
enforced, if at all, when the marriage ends.  There is, thus, likely to 
be a long time lapse between execution and enforcement during 
which the parties’ circumstances may change radically in 
unforeseen ways. 
While the antenuptial agreement is a contract, it is not an 
ordinary contract.  Its parties, purpose, subject matter and the time 
between execution and enforcement set it apart.  This deviation 
creates a dilemma for the law.  Prospective spouses, of course, have 
an interest in making their own bargains and, thereby, settling 
rights which might otherwise be litigated.  As freely made bargains, 
antenuptial agreements should be encouraged and enforced.  To 
the extent, however, that they are likely to be the product of 
overreaching, vary or diminish the state-prescribed protections for 
the couple, or may become unfair by the time enforcement is 
sought, the law is wary of according them validity.  This conflict 
makes antenuptial agreements less stable than ordinary contracts 
and explains why ordinary contract rules are not sufficient to 
contain them.  Historically, antenuptial provisions dealing with 
death of a spouse have had a better prospect for enforcement than 
those governing divorce.12  The latter were at one time considered 
void ab initio as violative of public policy.13  The law has 
reconsidered and since about 1970, provisions governing both 
types of marital dissolution stand on a more equal footing.  Exactly 
what that footing is varies from state to state.  Generally, courts 
facing a challenge to the validity of an antenuptial agreement will 
examine the antenuptial agreement more stringently than they 
would an ordinary contract.  This examination includes the 
circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement as well as 
the circumstances in which it is sought to be enforced.  Courts look 
for both procedural and substantive fairness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 11. See, e.g., McAlpine, 679 So. 2d at 91-92; Thies, 903 P.2d at 188. 
 12. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind. 1996). 
 13. Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Alaska 1987).  See discussion 
infra Part II A-C. 
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 Special Rules of Fairness for Antenuptial Agreements 
 
Procedure 
 
Procedural fairness in this context is generally thought to 
mean that the parties entered the agreement voluntarily, after 
making financial disclosure to each other.14  The search for 
voluntariness begins as a common law review for fraud, 
overreaching or sharp dealing,15 but goes further than the similar 
inquiry for ordinary contracts.  Courts look at the circumstances of 
the parties, their experience, the time of the signing of the 
agreement in relation to the wedding and the representation of 
each party by independent counsel.16  The requirement of 
disclosure is closely related to voluntariness.  Most agreements 
contain waivers of marital property rights which cannot be fair or 
voluntary if the waiving party has no idea of the other’s assets.  The 
standard for disclosure varies from state to state, with the relative 
sophistication of the parties,17 apparent fairness or unfairness of the 
terms of the agreement18 and other circumstances unique to the 
litigants.19  The standard is described variously as “fair,”20 “full,”21 
“full and fair,”22 “material,”23 and “adequate.”24  At a minimum, it 
should be sufficient to give each party a clear idea of the other’s 
resources.25  A simple and effective procedure for ensuring 
disclosure is to attach schedules to the agreement itself.26  A lack of 
 
 14. E.g., De Lorean v. De Lorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1986); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984). 
 15. E.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 733 (Colo. 1982). 
 16. E.g., Norris v. Norris, 419 A.2d 982, 985 (D.C. 1980). 
 17. E.g., Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 785 (Nev. 1992) (“Vicky is in 
fact extremely unsophisticated with respect to business matters”). 
 18. E.g., In re the Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1996). 
 19. E.g., Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn. 1996) (holding 
that wife’s cancer illness was a significant factor in determining the agreement’s 
validity). 
 20. E.g., Wiley v. Iverson, 985 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Mont. 1999); In re Thies, 903 
P.2d 186, 190 (Mont. 1995). 
 21. E.g., Sogg, 832 P.2d at 786. 
 22. E.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990); Randolph, 937 
S.W.2d at 817.  
 23. E.g., Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1994). 
 24. E.g., In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Iowa 1996). 
 25. “[A] general knowledge of the true nature and extent of the other’s 
property is sufficient.”  Id. 
 26. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d at 821. 
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disclosure can be overcome by a waiver27 or a showing that a party 
had actual knowledge of the other’s assets.28 
Substance 
The review for substantive fairness is more difficult to describe.  
As it applies to the terms of the agreement, it is not a substitution 
of the court’s  notions of what is right for the parties’ bargain.29  It 
is “amorphous,”30  made on a case by case basis31 and the standard is 
variously described as “reasonable,”32 “fair,”33 “not 
unconscionable,”34 and “equitable,”35 for example.  Substantive 
fairness is sometimes measured, along with procedural fairness, at 
the time of execution of the agreement36 and, with increasing 
frequency, at the time of enforcement as well.37  In making this 
review, courts try to avoid hardship visited on a party by unforeseen 
consequences of enforcement—for example, a spouse left at a 
drastically lower standard of living, unable to provide, or a public 
charge.38 
Typical of the broadest review of an antenuptial agreement in 
terms of substantive fairness  is the Minnesota case of McKee-Johnson 
v. Johnson,39 decided in 1989.  In it, after finding the agreement 
procedurally fair, the Minnesota Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the trial court for a review of substantive fairness at both the 
time of execution and the time of enforcement.  It told the lower 
court its job was to review the substantive fairness of the agreement 
in light of circumstances at execution by inquiring “into facts 
bearing upon the reasonable expectations of each signatory as to 
the scope and ultimate effect of the contract” if the marriage ended 
 
 27. E.g., Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Minn. 1980). 
 28. E.g., Randolph, 937 S.W.2d at 817. 
 29. E.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728,734 (Colo. 1982); Gross v. Gross, 
464 N.E.2d 500, 509 (Ohio 1984). 
 30. Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 551 (Wis. 1986). 
 31. Id. 
 32. E.g., In re  Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1996). 
 33. E.g., Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 785 (Nev. 1992). 
 34. E.g., Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1022 (R.I. 1994). 
 35. E.g., Button, 388 N.W.2d at 547. 
 36. E.g., Penhallow, 649 A.2d at 1021. 
 37. E.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989); 
Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. 1996). 
 38. E.g., Newman, 653 P.2d at 734-35; Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510. 
 39. 444 N.W.2d 259. 
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in divorce.40  The lower court was to undertake a further substantive 
review to determine “what effect, if any, the birth of the parties’ 
child, and any sequences of that event, significantly resulted in 
changed circumstances” that would make “the enforcement . . . 
oppressive and unconscionable.”41  The court said it could not state 
precise rules for the review to aid the trial courts because each case 
hinges on its specific facts.  It summed up by saying, “[t]rial courts 
engaging in such a review must strike a balance between the law’s 
policy favoring freedom of contract between informed consenting 
adults, and substantive fairness—admittedly a difficult task.”42 
At the other end of the spectrum on the issue of substantive 
fairness is the Pennsylvania case of Simeone v. Simeone,43 decided a 
year after McKee-Johnson.44  In it, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
upheld the agreement before it as procedurally fair, but 
abandoned its earlier position that it would review antenuptial 
agreements for substantive fairness.  In its judgment, such a review 
at the time of execution severely undermines the functioning and 
reliability of an agreement and is, therefore, not a proper subject 
for judicial inquiry.45  It also rejected any inquiry into substantive 
fairness at the time of enforcement.  Although it recognized that 
post-execution events like “the possibilities of illness, birth of 
children, reliance upon a spouse, career change, financial gain or 
loss, and numerous other events”46  might cause unfairness at 
enforcement, it declined to review for them.47  In its view, all such 
events are foreseeable; thus, if parties do not include them in their 
agreements, they should be seen as having contracted to bear the 
risks of their occurrence.48  Courts should not ignore this “by 
proceeding to determine whether a prenuptial agreement was . . . 
reasonable at the time of its inception or the time of divorce.”49 
 
     40.    Id. at 267. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 267-68. 
 43. 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990). 
 44. 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989). 
 45. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 166. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss2/8
06_FORMAT.YOUNGER.10.12.01.DOC 11/1/2001  6:00 PM 
2001] ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS 703 
II. THE CASES SINCE SIMEONE 
Since Simeone,50 the highest courts of twelve states have decided 
fourteen cases in which they ruled on the validity of challenged 
antenuptial agreements.  A review of these cases shows that courts 
continue to scrutinize these agreements for procedural and 
substantive fairness.  However, one court, after conducting such a 
review, expressed its dislike for the process of reviewing for 
substance. 
A.  Substance and Procedure 
In In re Marriage of Spiegel,51 decided by the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in 1996, the wife attacked the agreement as being 
procedurally and substantively unfair.52  The trial court agreed as to 
procedural unfairness, finding that it was “gained  through fraud, 
duress, and undue influence.”53  The husband appealed, relying on 
the fact that the prospective wife was represented by counsel who 
fully advised her of the deficiencies of the agreement.54  She, 
nevertheless, signed it.55  The Supreme Court disagreed with the 
trial court.  It found the agreement “fairly, freely, and 
understandingly entered into,”56 despite the fact that the 
prospective husband lied about the reasons for wanting it57 and his 
timing presented the prospective wife “with the dilemma of 
canceling a wedding or submitting to the agreement.”58  It said, 
“Sara signed the agreement voluntarily, albeit reluctantly.”59  A 
dissenting justice, accepting the majority’s facts, thought the 
agreement should not be enforced because of the prospective 
husband’s conduct.60 
The court found the agreement substantively fair as well.  The 
 
 50. 581 A.2d 162. 
 51. 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996). 
     52.    Id. at 316-17. 
 53. Id. at 313. 
 54. Id. at 312. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 315. 
 57. Id. at 311, 317. 
 58. Id. at 317. 
 59. Id. 
 60. “A.J.’s conduct and timing robbed Sara of a fair ability to reject the 
agreement.  Nowithstanding the availability of legal counsel, I think she was, 
because of A.J.’s conduct, not equipped to accept her lawyer’s advice.”  Id. at 322 
(Harris, J., dissenting). 
7
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test, it said, was that “[t]he person challenging the agreement must 
prove its terms are unfair or the person’s waiver of rights was not 
knowing and voluntary . . . .”61  Further, the court stated, “we hold 
the terms of an agreement are fair when the provisions of the 
contract are mutual or the division of property is consistent with 
the financial condition of the parties at the time of execution.”62  
The court declined to substitute its notions of fairness for the 
parties’ bargain.63  It pointed out that the wife did not forfeit all 
marital rights, but retained her statutory rights on the husband’s 
death and received a joint interest in the marital home.64  Her net 
worth thus increased during marriage.65  In addition, the 
relinquishment of marital rights on divorce was mutual, as were all 
other provisions of the agreement.66  Thus, the agreement was 
substantively fair.  The husband did not suggest in his argument 
that the court should abandon its usual review for substantive 
fairness; however, the court, noting “that issue is not before us,” 
nevertheless took the occasion to discuss it.67  It expressed 
increasing reluctance to review antenuptial agreements for 
substance, lamented the “amorphous” nature of such reviews, the 
difficulties involved in making them and stated its approval of 
Simeone v. Simeone.68  It said: 
[a] court should not ignore the parties’ expressed intent 
by proceeding to determine whether a prenuptial 
agreement was, in the court’s view, reasonable at the time 
of inception or the time of divorce.  These are exactly the 
sorts of judicial determinations that such agreements are 
designed to avoid.  Rare indeed is the agreement that is 
beyond possible challenge when reasonableness is 
involved.69 
In three other cases in which the substance of the agreements 
was an issue, the courts employed different standards but showed 
no reluctance in reviewing for substance.  In Sogg v. Nevada State 
Bank,70 the Nevada Supreme Court stated the standard as follows: 
 
 61. Id. at 316 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 315. 
 68. 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990). 
 69. Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d at 315. 
 70. 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992). 
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antenuptial agreements are 
enforceable unless unconscionable, obtained through 
fraud, misrepresentation, material nondisclosure or 
duress . . . .  Because of the presumed fiduciary 
relationship existing between parties who are engaged to 
be married, a presumption of fraud has been found where 
the agreement entered greatly disfavors one of the 
parties.71 
The presumption of fraud arose in this case because the 
agreement signed by the prospective wife “left her with no 
resources or means of support in the event of divorce, and because 
[she] probably would have received more under the community 
property laws of Nevada . . . .”72  Because the prospective wife had 
not had an opportunity to get the advice of an independent 
attorney, was not experienced in business, was pushed into signing 
the agreement by the prospective husband and did not have the 
benefit of full disclosure of his assets, the presumption was not 
rebutted and the antenuptial agreement was invalid.73  The court so 
held despite the fact that the parties, when they married, were fifty-
five and eighty-seven, respectively, had been married before and 
the present marriage lasted a mere eight months.74 
In Penhallow v. Penhallow,75 the defendant was fifty and the 
plaintiff was seventy-eight at the time of the marriage.  The plaintiff 
had never been married and the defendant had been divorced 
after twenty-eight years.  The present marriage lasted four years.76  
The plaintiff was not represented by counsel and the agreement, 
drafted by the defendant’s lawyer,77 was signed on the day of the 
wedding.78  This case is not in the usual mold in terms of the 
parties’ positions or the agreement’s terms.  Here, the husband 
challenged the agreement and the wife sought to enforce it.79  On 
 
 71. Id. at 783-84. 
 72. Id. at 784. 
 73. Id. at 785-86. 
 74. Id. at 782-83. 
 75. 649 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 1994). 
 76. Id. at 1018-19. 
 77. Id. at 1018.  It is undisputed that the plaintiff did not have the assistance 
of counsel at the time the agreement was signed.  Id. at 1022.  However, the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act does not require the presence of counsel as a 
condition for enforceability of a premarital agreement.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 1018. 
 79. Id. at 1019. 
9
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its face, the agreement was one-sided.80  Under the premarital 
agreement (1) all the wife’s property was to remain her separate 
property; (2) the husband was to transfer all his realty into a 
tenancy by the entirety with the wife; and (3) the husband was to 
transfer his cash and the contents of his safety deposit boxes into a 
joint tenancy with her.  If the wife initiated a divorce, separation or 
annulment of the marriage, she was required to return all property 
acquired under the agreement.81  If, however, the husband initiated 
such a proceeding, the wife would retain fifty percent of what she 
had acquired.82  The family court invalidated the agreement on the 
ground that it was unconscionable when executed.83  Under the 
Rhode Island version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 
unconscionability at execution is not enough to invalidate an 
agreement.84  The challenger must also prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that he did not enter into it voluntarily and 
that before executing it he was not provided with fair and 
reasonable disclosure, did not waive such disclosure or have actual 
knowledge of the other party’s assets.85  This, according to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court, the husband failed to do.  Thus, it 
reversed the lower court and found the agreement enforceable.86 
In Matter of the Estate of Lutz,87 the North Dakota Supreme 
Court tested an antenuptial agreement containing mutual waivers 
of the prospective spouses’ shares of each other’s estates for 
voluntariness and unconscionability at both execution and at 
enforcement.88  The surviving spouse was unrepresented at 
execution of the agreement89 but eight months elapsed between 
the time she received a draft of it and the time it was executed.  
 
 80. Id. at 1018. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1020. 
     84.     Id. at 1021 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 15-17-6(a)(2)(1988)). 
 85. Id. at 1022. 
 86. There was an issue about plaintiff’s mental capacity to enter the 
agreement in the first place.  Husband did not plead incapacity in his complaint; 
the trial court refused to consider testimony on the subject and the supreme court 
refused to deal with the issue on appeal.  Id. at 1023.  It seems, however, that 
justice was ultimately done when the Rhode Island Supreme Court later held that 
defendant’s filing a complaint for protection from abuse constituted an initiation 
of the parties’ separation which required her to return all property she acquired 
under the antenuptial agreement.  Penhallow, 725 A.2d at 896. 
 87. 620 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 2000). 
 88. Id. at 595, 596. 
 89. Id. at 595. 
10
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The court thus found she had had plenty of time to consult her 
own counsel.90  The court also rejected her claims of 
unconscionability at execution and enforcement.91  It said, “Lavilla 
voluntarily entered into the agreement, and has received exactly 
what she agreed to receive.”92 
B.  Substance: Alimony Waivers 
Alimony (spousal support) has always been a sensitive subject 
in the context of antenuptial agreements.  Some states have refused 
to permit agreements to control the issue holding that provisions 
which attempt to do so are void per se.  Others have allowed such 
provisions, subjecting them to a review for fairness at enforcement.  
In the ten years since the Simeone case, five93 of the states’ highest 
courts addressed the validity of antenuptial waivers of alimony:  the 
waivers were enforced in all but one case.  The California,94 
Louisiana,95 and Tennessee Supreme Courts96 held that alimony 
waivers are no longer void per se, as against public policy, and are, 
thus, proper subjects of antenuptial agreements.  Each court then 
proceeded to uphold the waiver as applied to the particular couple 
before it.  The Supreme Court of California declined to decide 
“whether circumstances existing at the time enforcement of such a 
waiver is sought might make enforcement unjust.”97  The majority, 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 597. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000); Rider v. Rider, 669 
N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996); In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996); 
McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85 (La. 1996); Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777 
(Tenn. 1996). 
 94. E.g., Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839. 
 95. E.g., McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85. 
 96. E.g., Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777. 
 97. Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839.  In this case each spouse, at the time of dissolution, 
had a net worth of approximately $2.5 million.  Wife was an aspiring writer with a 
master’s degree and two children from an earlier marriage.  She declared her 
monthly gross income as $5,772 (including $1,352 in social security  benefits for 
the children).  Husband was a businessman with a doctorate in pharmacology and 
a law degree; he owned interests in various business ventures and companies.  
Each party was represented at execution of the agreement by independent 
counsel.  Thus the court concluded: 
that no public policy is violated by  permitting enforcement of a waiver 
of spousal support executed by intelligent, well-educated persons, each 
of whom appears to be self-sufficient in property and earning ability, 
and both of whom have the advice of counsel regarding their rights 
and obligations as marital partners at the time they execute the waiver. 
11
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thus, incurred the wrath of the dissenting Justice Kennard who 
accused it of abdicating its responsibility for laying out guidelines 
to the bench, bar and public “explaining when, if ever, such waivers 
are enforceable.”98 
Both Louisiana99 and Tennessee100 made the tests of 
enforceability of alimony waivers clear.  In Louisiana, the supreme 
court, reversing the court of appeals, found the waiver did not 
violate public policy and would be enforced or not enforced 
according to the rules applicable to other contracts, “namely the 
Civil Code articles dealing with capacity, consent, error, fraud, and 
duress.”101  Applying the Code, the majority upheld the waiver.  Two 
dissenters thought the prospective wife was coerced.  In Tennessee, 
the standard laid out by the supreme court is essentially the same as 
that of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act;102 however, 
Tennessee has not adopted it.  The court said: 
So long as the antenuptial agreement was entered into 
freely and knowledgeably, with adequate disclosure, and 
without undue influence or overreaching, the provision 
limiting or waiving alimony will be enforced, with one 
exception . . . .  The trial court must examine the terms of 
the antenuptial agreement at the time of the divorce to 
ensure that its enforcement will not result in the spouse 
being deprived of alimony, becoming a public charge.  If 
a spouse would be rendered a public charge by specific 
enforcement, the trial court must void the provision and 
award alimony.103 
 
Id. at 848. 
 98. Id. at 852. 
 99. E.g., McAlpine, 679 So. 2d at 85. 
 100. E.g., Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777. 
 101. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d at 93.  In addition to an alimony waiver, the 
antenuptial agreement provided for a separate property regime and a lump sum 
payment to wife of $25,000 at divorce if the marriage lasted less than six years and 
$50,000 if it lasted longer. Id. at 86.  If wife contested the alimony waiver the lump 
sum payment provisions would be null and void.  McAlpine v. McAlpine, 637 So. 
2d 1163, 1163-64 (La. Ct. App. 1994).  Prospective wife was presented with the 
agreement one week before the wedding after the wedding invitations had been 
mailed.  Prospective husband was a lawyer and prospective wife was 
unrepresented.  Neither prospective husband nor his lawyer suggested to her that 
she obtain counsel.  Two dissenting members of the court thought the agreement 
was the product of duress or of overreaching and should not be enforced.  
McAlpine, 679 So.2d at 93-94. 
 102. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1983). 
 103. Cary, 937 S.W.2d at 781.  In the case before it the parties were a forty-two- 
year-old lawyer and a thirty-year-old teacher with a Master’s degree and eleven 
12
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The Court upheld the waiver as applied to a wife with teaching 
experience. 
In Indiana,104 the supreme court, using the test of 
unconscionability at enforcement, reversed two lower courts to 
uphold the validity of an alimony waiver.  It did so despite the fact 
that the wife’s health had deteriorated so badly during the couple’s 
four and one-half year marriage that she could no longer work, 
enforcement of the waiver might force her to sell her home and 
her claims for disability and social security had been denied.105  The 
court noted that the wife brought most of the property to the 
marriage.  At divorce she had assets of at least $65,000 (largely the 
value of her house) and received $645 a month in child support 
from a former spouse.106  The husband brought into the marriage a 
few personal assets and a modest income from more than thirty-five 
years of work.107  During the marriage, he retired and at divorce he 
had assets worth a few thousand dollars and a pension of $1,247 a 
month.108  The court observed that, at the time of execution of the 
agreement, the husband was nearing retirement and the wife had 
had several surgeries.  “If support had been important to either . . . 
surely it would have been included . . . .”109  According to the court, 
“unconscionability involves a gross disparity,”110 and a finding of it 
at enforcement requires a comparison of the parties’ situations.111 
Unfortunately, the comparison the court made was the wrong 
one.  It compared the financial situations of the parties at 
 
years of teaching experience.  Id. at 777.  In upholding the alimony waiver the 
Court said, “there is nothing in the record to suggest that enforcement of the 
agreement will render Cathy Cary, a person with substantial prior teaching 
experience, a public charge.”  Id. at 782. 
 104. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996). 
 105. Id. at 161. 
 106. Id. at 164. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. The court found that: 
[e]nforcement of the antenuptial agreement would leave one spouse 
with virtually all of the real and personal property, while leaving the 
other spouse with a modest income stream.  This is what the parties 
brought into their short marriage, and this is what they sought to 
protect.  The alternative, as ordered by the trial court, would provide 
[wife] with almost all of the property and a significant percentage of 
the income stream.  Given [husband’s] limited financial position, we 
do not find enforcement to be unconscionable. 
Id. 
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enforcement.112  The crucial comparison, however, is between the 
challenging party’s expectations at the time of execution and his or 
her situation at enforcement.  At the time the agreement was 
executed, both parties were working, she as an auditor, he at the 
same company where he had worked for thirty-five years.  
Obviously, the parties did not expect one of them to become 
disabled and, thus, unable to work.  Accordingly, they did not 
provide for it.  By the time of enforcement of the agreement, there 
was a radical change in Mrs. Rider’s circumstances.  The trial court 
found enforcement “would leave Mrs. Rider unable to provide for 
her reasonable needs,” that she was “not capable of supporting 
herself” by earning income and that she did “not possess assets 
sufficient to provide her with adequate support.”113  The supreme 
court should have relieved her from the harshness of enforcement, 
as had the two lower courts before it. 
In In re Matter of Spiegel,114 the Iowa Supreme Court refused to 
enforce an alimony waiver even though it was made during a 
period of time when such waivers were permissable.115  It adhered 
to past and present Iowa law holding that such waivers are void.116  
Accordingly, the court awarded alimony of $3,000 a month to the 
wife, reducing the trial court’s $7,000 a month award by more than 
one half.117 
C.  Procedure 
In six cases, wives challenged the validity of the antenuptial 
agreements on procedural grounds alone, namely that the 
agreement was not entered into voluntarily and/or that the 
prospective husbands failed to disclose.  In three of these cases the 
challengers were surviving widows and in three they were divorcees.  
In Matter of Estate of Beesley,118 the agreement limited the wife’s share 
of the husband’s estate to fifty percent.119  The couple met through 
a personal ad.  He lived in Utah and she lived in Texas.120  He was 
well off with “substantial possessions,” including commercial real 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 161 
 114. 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996). 
 115. Id. at 319. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 320. 
 118. 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994). 
 119. Id. at 1345. 
 120. Id. 
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estate, several airplanes and automobiles, as well as investment and 
retirement income.121  She was a nurse’s aid earning about $3.50 an 
hour.122  He flew to Texas to meet her.123  She agreed to marry him, 
quit her job and travel with him to Utah.124  There he asked her to 
sign an antenuptial agreement.125  Neither party was represented by 
counsel at signing; indeed, the prospective husband had a standard 
form to which he made several changes.126  The prospective wife 
typed the agreement and both signed it.127  When the husband died 
intestate five years after the marriage the wife challenged the 
agreement on the grounds that there was no financial disclosure128 
and that she was coerced into signing it because she had quit her 
job, agreed to marry and moved from Texas to Utah before the 
prospective husband ever raised the issue of such an agreement.129  
While “material nondisclosure” would ordinarily invalidate an 
antenuptial agreement,130 the court found that it did not do so in 
this case because the agreement provided the wife with a 
percentage of the estate rather than a specific sum;131 there was no 
evidence she’d have done anything differently had she known  her 
husband’s net worth;132 and her share under the agreement 
exceeded the amount she would have received under Utah’s 
elective share statutes.133  The court also rejected the wife’s claim of 
involuntariness, accepting the lower court’s findings of fact.134  In 
Matter of Estate of Thies,135 both parties waived their elective shares 
under the antenuptial agreement.136  Upon the husband’s death 
the wife challenged this provision as it applied to her, based upon 
his failure to disclose.137  The agreement itself acknowledged that 
the parties had fully disclosed to each other; however, there were 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1347. 
 129. Id. at 1348. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1349. 
 135. 903 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1995). 
 136. Id. at 187. 
 137. Id. 
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no lists of assets or values attached to it.138  The court nevertheless 
found the statutory test of “fair disclosure” satisfied.139  Justice 
Leaphart dissented,140 pointing out that the agreement was 
prepared by the husband’s attorney who testified that at the fifteen-
minute meeting to discuss and sign it, neither he nor the 
prospective husband disclosed husband’s assets to the wife.141  She 
was not represented by counsel and had not read the agreement.142  
In the dissenter’s view, “Montana is now alone in holding that the 
test of ‘fair disclosure’ can be satisfied with a mere recitation of 
disclosure in the absence of any financial information from 
independent sources or other mitigating circumstances.”143  In Wiley 
v. Iverson,144 the Montana Supreme Court again considered the 
validity of an antenuptial waiver of a widow’s rights.  Again, the 
agreement alleged disclosure but the schedules showing the 
prospective husband’s assets were not attached to it when the 
prospective wife read it.145  The court reaffirmed its decision in 
Thies146 and its language from the earlier case: 
Fair disclosure contemplates that each spouse should be 
given information, of a general and approximate nature, 
concerning the net worth of the other.  Each party has a 
duty to consider and evaluate the information received before 
signing an agreement since they are not assumed to have lost 
their judgmental facilities because of their pending 
marriage.147 
It again upheld the agreement.148  Significantly, Justice 
Leaphart now concurred in the judgment,149 presumably because 
the wife and husband had worked together for years before 
deciding to marry and the wife was close to the husband’s family 
even before the marriage.150  Thus, she had actual knowledge of his 
 
 138. Id. at 190. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 191. 
 141. Id. at 192. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. 985 P.2d 1176 (Mont. 1999). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1181 (citing holding of Thies, 903 P.2d at 190). 
 147. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 148. Id. at 1181-82. 
 149. Id. at 1182. 
 150. See id. at 1181. 
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assets and sources of income.151 
In Randolph v. Randolph,152 the challenge was based on the 
argument that the husband failed to disclose and the wife, thus, did 
not have enough information to enter the agreement 
“knowledgeably.”153  According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, 
“knowledgeably” means: 
that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial 
agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the 
nature, extent and value of his or her holdings was 
provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or 
that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse 
seeking to avoid the agreement had independent 
knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the 
proponent spouse’s holdings.154 
In this case the parties, C.L. and Virginia, were fifty-two and 
forty-six respectively.155  He had been married five times before 
while she had been married once and had a thirteen-year-old son.156  
The couple, and Virginia’s son, lived together for about a year 
before the marriage.157  At the time, she had “virtually no assets” 
and he had substantial real estate holdings and a net worth of 
about $500,000 to $600,000.158  Virginia testified that she had never 
seen the agreement until the day she signed it—one day before the 
wedding.159  The agreement, apparently, recited that she had 
independent counsel but, in actuality, she did not.160  Neither did 
she have actual knowledge of C.L.’s assets and he made no 
disclosure.161  The court stated that he was “a learned businessman 
very shrewd in his dealings.”162  She had no business experience or 
knowledge.163  She was suffering from breast cancer at the time she 
signed the agreement and was responsible for a minor child.164  She 
 
 151. See id. 
 152. 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996). 
 153. Id. at 817. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 818. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 818, 822. 
 162. Id. at 818. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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testified that her only choice was to sign the agreement or be 
thrown out of the residence she and her son had shared with C.L. 
for the previous year.165  The trial and appellate courts all agreed 
that the antenuptial agreement should not be enforced.166 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher,167 the Supreme Court of Ohio, in a four to 
three decision, upheld the validity of an antenuptial agreement 
which, though it did not mention the word “divorce,” operated to 
deprive the wife of any marital property.  The wife challenged it as 
the product of fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching by husband. 
The prospective husband was represented by a partner of the 
attorney who represented the prospective wife in her previous 
divorce.168  The wife was told that she could have independent legal 
counsel but she declined.169  The agreement was executed the day 
before the wedding.170  The majority of the court laid down the 
rules it purportedly applied: 
When an antenuptial agreement provides 
disproportionately less than the party challenging it would 
have received under an equitable distribution, the burden 
is on the one claiming the validity of the contract to show 
that the other party entered into it with the benefit of full 
knowledge or disclosure of the assets of the proponent.  
The burden of proving fraud, duress, coercion or 
overreaching, however, remains with the party 
challenging the agreement.171 
The court further stated that “the party financially 
disadvantaged must have a meaningful opportunity to consult with 
counsel.”172  There was no issue of disclosure since schedules were 
attached to the agreement.  The issue was overreaching.  The 
burden of proof was on the wife.  The majority acknowledged that 
certain facts gave weight to the wife’s argument:  the agreement 
never mentioned divorce, the relationship between the attorney 
who represented prospective wife in her earlier divorce and the 
attorney who drafted the agreement may have led her to trust him 
unduly and the antenuptial agreement was presented to her on the 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 823. 
 167. 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994). 
 168. Id. at 1345. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1348. 
 171. Id. at 1347. 
 172. Id. at 1348. 
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eve of the wedding.173  The court, nevertheless, upheld the 
agreement.  The dissenters thought the agreement “should be 
unenforceable since its terms were unclear, the circumstances 
evidence that it was not entered into freely without fraud, duress, 
coercion, or overreaching, and . . . [husband] attempt[ed] to use it 
to deny [wife] her right to share in property acquired by the couple 
during their marriage.”174 
In Randolph175 and Sogg. v. Nevada State Bank,176 the only two of 
these fourteen cases in which the agreements were invalidated, the 
courts characterized the parties relationship as “confidential,” or 
“fiduciary:”  they, thus, owed each other “the utmost good faith.”177  
Most jurisdictions agree.178  California, however, repudiates such a 
view of the parties.  Thus, in In re Marriage of Bonds,179 a foreign-
born, unrepresented wife who signed an antenuptial agreement on 
the eve of her wedding to a major league baseball player was held 
not entitled to have the voluntariness of the agreement assessed on 
the assumption of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between 
the parties.180  It was, thus, not subject to strict scrutiny even though 
she, the less-sophisticated party, did not have independent counsel, 
waived all her marital rights, husband’s annual salary had grown 
from $106,000 at execution of the agreement to $8,000,000 at 
dissolution of the marriage and the agreement itself was a 
shambles—no original was presented at trial and what was 
presented was incomplete and filled with mistakes.181  The supreme 
court accepted the trial court’s conclusion that the prospective wife 
entered the agreement voluntarily,182 reversing the intermediate 
court which disagreed.183  The supreme court said: 
Because the Uniform Act was intended to enhance the 
enforceability of premarital agreements, because it 
expressly places the burden of proof upon the person 
challenging the agreement, and finally because the 
California statute imposing fiduciary duties in the family 
 
 173. Id. at 1347-48. 
 174. Id. at 1350 (emphasis in original). 
 175. 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996). 
 176. 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992). 
 177. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d at 819. 
 178. See supra note 7. 
 179. 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000). 
 180. Id. at 831. 
 181. Bonds v. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 787, 789, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
 182. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 833-34. 
 183. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. 
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law setting applies only to spouses, we do not believe that 
the commissioners of our Legislature contemplated that 
the voluntariness of a premarital agreement would be 
examined in light of the strict fiduciary duties imposed on 
persons such as lawyers, or imposed expressly by statute 
upon persons who are married.184 
III. THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT AND THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
California was the first state to adopt the Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act,185 although it, like a number of other 
jurisdictions,186 modified it to conform more closely to its own prior 
law.187  Since California’s adoption in 1985, twenty-five states 
followed suit.  The Act is now law in whole or part in some twenty-
six states.188  The last adoptions were Texas and Indiana in 1997.189  
As the California Supreme Court pointed out in the Bonds case,190 
the Act was intended to enhance the enforceability of antenuptial 
agreements.191  To that end, it specifically included spousal support 
as a permissible subject for antenuptial agreement192 and attempted 
to circumscribe courts in their reviews of these agreements for 
procedural and substantive fairness.  Under it, a spouse could avoid 
enforcement of an antenuptial agreement only by proving that at 
the time of execution it (1) was not voluntary, or (2) that it was 
unconscionable,193 there was no reasonable financial disclosure,194 
the right to disclosure was not waived and that the challenger did 
 
 184. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 832. 
 185. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369-80 (1983 & Supp. 
2001). 
 186. Id. at 372 (Supp. 2001). 
 187. California deleted subdivision (a)(4) from §3 of the UPAA; this section 
would have permitted the parties to contract with respect to modification or 
elimination of spousal support.  It also eliminated §6(b) providing for 
modification of alimony or support waivers, which, if enforced, would cause a 
spouse to become a public charge.  Pendleton v. Fireman, 5 P.3d 839, 841 (Cal. 
2000); Bonds, 5 P.3d at 822. 
 188. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 147 (Supp.  2001). 
 189. Id. 
 190. 5 P.3d at 832. 
 191. Id. at 832. 
 192. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373-74 (1983 & Supp. 
2001). 
 193. Id. § 6. 
 194. Id. 
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not have independent knowledge of the other party’s finances.195  
The Act also limited the review at enforcement to provisions 
waiving or modifying spousal support rights which, if enforced, 
would result in making a spouse eligible for public assistance.196  It 
has been roundly criticized,197 of course, and whether it has 
accomplished its goals in the adopting jurisdictions is hard to 
determine.  As one reads through the cases one is still struck by the 
uncertainty of enforcement of these agreements and the lack of 
uniformity in result, not only from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,198 but 
among trial and appellate courts ruling on the same facts in the 
same case and in the same state. 
Enter then, the American Law Institute, with its new Principles 
of Family Dissolution.199  The Principles provide procedural 
requirements for antenuptial agreements200 of the sort already 
required by most, if not all, states.201  These requirements are a 
signed writing,202 financial disclosure203 and a showing of informed 
consent not obtained under duress.204  The latter is the rough 
equivalent of the common law and Uniform Act requirements of 
voluntariness.205  The Reporters justify the new language by stating 
their desire to focus the courts’ attention on the tactics of the 
proponent of the agreement rather than on the state of mind of 
the challenger; however, the change seems little more than a 
misguided example of “elegant variation.”206  The Principles raise a 
presumption of informed consent and the absence of duress if the 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. §§ 3, 6. 
 197. Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127 (1993) (discussing the conflicts between 
the Act and modern law and concluding that the Act promotes contractual 
autonomy); Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, supra note 4, at 1086-90 
(criticizing the Act and discussing improvement by the addition of five new 
amendments). 
 198. Compare Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992) (concluding 
that prospective husband’s overreaching rendered the agreement involuntary and 
invalid) with Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994) (upholding 
agreement as valid even though prospective husband’s overreaching rendered the 
agreement involuntary). 
 199. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6. 
 200. Id. § 7.05. 
 201. See id. § 7.05 Reporter’s Notes. 
 202. Id. § 7.05(1). 
 203. Id. § 7.05(5). 
 204. Id. § 7.05(2). 
 205. Id. § 7.05, cmt. b. 
 206. JACQUES BARZUN, SIMPLE & DIRECT: A RHETORIC FOR WRITERS 108 (1975). 
21
Younger: Antenuptial Agreements
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
06_FORMAT.YOUNGER.10.12.01.DOC 11/1/2001  6:00 PM 
718 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2 
agreement was executed at least thirty days before the parties’ 
marriage,207 both parties were advised to obtain legal counsel and 
had opportunity to do so.208  In an important departure from 
existing law, the Principles put the burden of proving the lack of 
duress and the presence of consent on the party who is trying to 
enforce the agreement.209  The Reporters hope that this change in 
the usual contract rule210 will “caution[] the stronger party against 
overreaching tactics that would make this burden of proof more 
difficult to meet.”211  Had this provision been in effect in Louisiana 
and Ohio, it might well have changed the results in a number of 
the cases discussed.212  In cases where one party did not have 
independent counsel, for the presumption to arise, the agreement 
must contain understandable language explaining the significance 
of its terms and the fact that the parties’ interests may be adverse 
with respect to them.213 
It is on the subject of substantive fairness that the principles 
are most remarkable.  They depart from the Uniform Act and the 
common law by omitting any requirement of substantive fairness at 
the time of execution of an antenuptial agreement.  If contained in 
a signed writing and entered with disclosure, without duress and 
with informed consent, the agreement satisfies the test at execution 
no matter how one-sided or unfair its terms.  At enforcement, 
however, the Principles call for a wider substantive review of these 
agreements214 than called for by the Uniform Act.215  They, thus, 
move closer to McKee-Johnson v. Johnson216 and the Minnesota 
standard.  The Principles would prohibit enforcement of 
antenuptial agreements whenever enforcement would “work a 
substantial injustice.”217  Here, again, the Principles opt for new 
language abandoning the old standard of unconscionableness at 
 
 207. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.05(3)(a). 
 208. Id. § 7.05(3)(b). 
 209. Id. § 7.05(2). 
 210. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994). 
 211. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.05, cmt. b. 
 212. E.g., McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So.2d 85 (La. 1996); Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 
1343. 
 213. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.05(3)(c)(1)-(2). 
 214. Id. § 7.07. 
 215. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(B), 9B U.L.A. 373-74 (1983 & Supp. 
2001). 
 216. 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989) (holding that substantive fairness 
requirements should be examined both at inception and at dissolution). 
 217. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.07(1). 
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enforcement.  They lay out guidelines to help Courts in applying 
the new language.  Before making any inquiry into the effects of 
enforcement, under the Principles, one of three prerequisites must 
be present: the passage of a certain number of years after 
execution;218 or the birth or adoption of a child to parties who had 
no children at execution;219 or a significant, unexpected change in 
circumstances since execution.220  If one of these events has 
occurred the court can consider whether the enforcement of the 
agreement would work a substantial injustice.221  Again, in an 
attempt to help courts with the inquiry, the Principles lay out a 
number of factors which courts already consider:  the disparity of 
outcome under the agreement and under the marital property 
regime;222 the likely circumstances of the party challenging the 
agreement had the marriage never taken place;223 whether the 
agreement was designed to benefit or protect the interests of third 
parties;224 and the impact of its enforcement on post-execution 
children.225  Overall, the Principles are to be applauded for 
incorporating the best practices of the courts and trying to tread a 
middle ground between those who would refuse to enforce 
antenuptial agreements altogether and those who would enforce 
them as ordinary business contracts.226 
IV. CONCLUSION: DRAFTING FOR VALIDITY 
Whatever the exact fairness rules are in any particular 
jurisdiction, predictability remains an attainable goal in the 
drafting of antenuptial agreements.  The parties and their lawyers 
have complete control over the circumstances surrounding 
execution of the agreement as well as its contents.  Both parties 
should be represented by independent counsel who see that the 
 
 218. Id. § 7.07 (2)(a). 
 219. Id. § 7.07(2)(b). 
 220. Id. § 7.07(2)(c). 
 221. Id. § 7.07(2). 
 222. Id. § 7.07(3)(a). 
 223. Id. § 7.07(3)(b). 
 224. Id. § 7.07(3)(c). 
 225. Id. § 7.07(3)(d). 
 226. “This Chapter takes a position between the English rule that premarital 
contracts are not binding, and that the recent statements of some American courts 
that these contracts should be enforced as ordinary business contracts.  This 
intermediate position is in fact consistent with the actual practice of many, if not 
most, American courts.”  Unfortunately the Principles don’t apply to agreements 
that govern death of a spouse.  Id. § 7.02 cmt. a. 
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parties make full disclosure to each other.  As the California 
Supreme Court said in the Bonds case,227 “the best assurance of 
enforceability is independent representation for both parties,”228 
and the Supreme Court of Tennessee said in Randolph,229 “a fairly 
simple and effective method of proving disclosure is to attach a net 
worth schedule of assets, liabilities, and income to the agreement 
itself.”230  Lawyers should see to it that both parties have counsel.  
They should do so for their own benefit231 as well as for the benefit 
of their clients.  They should incorporate schedules of the parties’ 
assets into the agreement, review it for fairness, urge the parties to 
revise patently unfair provisions and explain in the agreement any 
which remain.  If these guidelines are followed, the agreement will 
be fairly procured and substantively fair at execution.  As simple as 
these precautions seem to be, the cases show that many lawyers 
ignore them.  In eleven of the fourteen cases discussed in this 
article, the parties challenging the agreement were not represented 
by independent counsel at execution.  In two cases,232 whether the 
challenging party had been represented or not is not apparent 
from the reports.  In one case,233 neither party had counsel.  In at 
least five234 of the cases, the agreements did not incorporate 
schedules of assets.  Perhaps a prime example of how not to do it 
comes from the Bonds case.235  The agreement was apparently a 
“thing of shreds and patches,”236 contained “numerous 
typographical errors,” referred to “schedules” of separate property 
but none were attached.237  The prospective wife was not 
represented.  The supreme court said “there is evidence that Barry 
 
 227. Bonds v. Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000). 
 228. Id. at 833. 
 229. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996). 
 230. Id. at 821. 
 231. So as to avoid any arguments that they owe a duty to the unrepresented 
party or are engaged in a conflict of interest.  See, e.g., Bonds, 5 P.3d at 883; Lutz v. 
Lutz, 620 N.W.2d 589, 594 (R.I. 2000); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 
(1983). 
 232. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996); Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777 
(Tenn. 1996). 
 233. Estate of Beesley v. Harris, 833 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994). 
 234. Bonds, 5 P.3d 815; Estate of Thies v. Lowe, 903 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1995); 
Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992); Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815; 
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343. 
 235. 5 P.3d 815. 
 236. Gilbert and Sullivan, A Wandering Minstrel I, from The Mikado, lyrics in 
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN AT HOME 152 (1927). 
 237. Bonds v. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr.2d 783, 788-89 (Cal.  Ct. App. 1999). 
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did not understand the legal fine points of the agreement any 
more than Sun did.”238  No “responsible attorney could have 
reasonably predicted” that this agreement would be enforced.239  
Yet the court upheld it as voluntarily entered into and valid. 
As to the substantive fairness of an agreement at enforcement, 
it is obvious that no lawyer or party can control future events.  The 
birth of a child or changes in a spouse’s financial status, 
employability or health after execution may make enforcement of 
the agreement seem unfair even though it was fairly procured and 
substantively fair when executed.  The key to softening the impact 
of post-execution events is to foresee their possible occurrence and 
to provide for them.240  The Rider241 case is another prime example 
of how not to do it.  At the time the agreement was executed, both 
parties were working.  Obviously, the parties did not expect one of 
them to become disabled and did not provide for it.  They should 
have foreseen that possibility and planned for it.242  Had they done 
so, certainly it would have enhanced the stability of their 
agreement.  Two courts held it unenforceable but the Supreme 
Court of Indiana mistakenly upheld it.243  The lesson to learn from 
this review is that lawyers are making unnecessary mistakes and so 
are courts.  Lawyers are allowing parties to go unrepresented, not 
attaching asset schedules to their agreements, failing to plan for 
foreseeable events and engaging in sloppy drafting.  Courts, 
perhaps brain-washed by the hyperbole accompanying the Uniform 
Act, are enforcing agreements they should set aside.  The ALI 
Principles with their emphasis on representation and the review for 
substance at enforcement, may herald a much needed 
improvement in lawyering and judging in this field.  It remains to 
be seen if they will be followed. 
 
 
 238. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 837. See also Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348 
(Ohio 1994) (“Prenuptial agreements are often drafted in such a way as to be 
nearly incomprehensible to a layperson.”). 
 239. Bonds, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d at 803. 
 240. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); 
Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 
1985). 
 241. Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996). 
 242. Id. at 164. 
 243. See supra notes 104-13. 
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